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LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS V. CITY OF
NEW ORLEANS: STANDING IN SUITS AGAINST
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
The League of Women Voters and two taxpayer plaintiffs filed suit
against the city of New Orleans and its mayor; the City Council and
its individual members; the Board of Levee Commissioners of Orleans
Parish; the Board of Assessors of Orleans Parish and the individual
assessors; and the Legislative Auditor of the state claiming that, as a
result of erroneous information furnished by the assessors, the 1978
millage was incorrectly and unconstitutionally fixed, causing the city and
levee board to lose several million dollars in tax revenue. Accordingly,
the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus directing the various govern-
ment agencies and officials to furnish the proper information and re-
compute and adjust millages in compliance with state law. The plaintiffs
were denied relief by the trial court on the grounds that the duty of
the defendants was discretionary and hence not subject to mandamus.'
The court of appeal agreed as to all defendants except the assessors,
whom they found had a mandatory duty to furnish certain assessed
valuations of taxable property.2 The supreme court dismissed the action
as to all defendants, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring
the suit. League of Women Voters v. City of New Orleans, 381 So. 2d
441 (La. 1980).
In the appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the defendants filed
an exception of no cause or right of action, and the court held that
the issue of whether the plaintiffs had stated a cause of action was
pretermitted since they did not have a right of action. The court stated
the question regarding the right of action narrowly: "whether the League
and the two taxpayers have standing to call the various defendants into
court and obtain an order against them requiring them to carry out
certain governmental functions, here essentially the raising of taxes."'
The plaintiffs had alleged, as their interest in the outcome of the suit,
their individual interest in receiving sufficient police, fire, and flood
protection. Justice Watson, writing for the majority, held that in order
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Mandamus will lie only to enforce ministerial and-not discretionary duties. Bagert
v. Moreau, 325 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied 329 So. 2d 465, 329 So.
2d 466, 329 So. 2d 467 (1976).
2. League of Women Voters v. City of New Orleans, 375 So. 2d 1187, 1191 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979).
3. League of Women Voters v. City of New Orleans, 381 So. 2d 441, 446 (La.
1980) (emphasis added).
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to enforce a public right or duty, a plaintiff must have a "special
interest . . . distinct from the interest of the public at large," and that
the injuries alleged by the plaintiffs were "not peculiar to plaintiffs
themselves or even to taxpayers as a class, but are common to the
public at large."' 4 Justice Watson cited State ex rel. Schoeffner v. Dowling
for the "peculiar interest" requirement, but then noted that Bussie v.
Long 6 had created an exception to the requirement. The Bussie court
held that when a public official charged with the unlawful performance
or the refusal to perform a legal duty discriminates against a taxpayer
by increasing his tax burden or otherwise injuriously affecting his person
or property, the taxpayer need not show a peculiar interest in order to
sustain a right of action. However, Justice Watson held, the League
of Women Voters could not claim the Bussie exception to the "peculiar
interest" rule since (1) they sought an increase, not a decrease, in taxes,
(2) the injuries alleged were not peculiar to the plaintiffs but common
to the public at large, and (3) the plaintiffs had made no showing that
the revenues, if collected, would have been allocated to the particular
areas in which the plaintiffs alleged their injuries.7
Justice Watson's first reason for denying standing is the most per-
suasive. The second reason, however, may demonstrate some confusion
regarding the nature of the suit. Since this is a taxpayer suit, the plaintiffs
should not have to allege "special and peculiar" injuries, and the suit
should be considered one in which the public complains. This, at least,
would be the holding of Donaldson v. Police Jury.' The third reason
is probably valid, in that the likelihood that any taxes collected would
be applied to police and fire protection is certainly speculative.
The problem of standing to sue public officials has a long and
sometimes confusing history in Louisiana jurisprudence, as witnessed by
the disagreement among the majority, the concurrence, and dissents in
League, as well as by the differences as to the breadth of the League
decision voiced by the courts of appeal. The League decision is not
strong precedent: the court split 4-1-2, and Justice Calogero's concurrence,
which would leave the court of appeal's decision undisturbed, is perhaps
better defined as a dissent in part and a concurrence in part, since he
apparently would have granted the writ against the assessors, while
dismissing it against the other plaintiffs. Dissenting Justices Dixon and
Dennis are of the view that the plaintiffs have standing. Dixon finds
that the " 'special and peculiar' interest of plaintiffs in Bussie v. Long
... was no more 'special and peculiar' than that of plaintiffs in this
4. Id. at 447.
5. 158 La. 706, 104 So. 624 (1925).
6. 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (1974).
7. League, 381 So. 2d at 447.
8. 161 La. 471, 709 So. 34 (1926).
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case." 9 Dennis quotes from Stewart v. Stanley for the proposition that
Louisiana allows standing to taxpayers when they assert injuries other
than increased taxes:
[A] taxpayer may resort to judicial authority to restrain public
servants from transcending their lawful powers or violating their
legal duty in any unauthorized mode which would increase the
burden of taxation or otherwise unjustly affect the taxpayer or
his property. The fact that the taxpayer's interest might be small
and not susceptible of accurate determination is not sufficient
to deprive him of the right. The action is regarded as having
a public character and as being a proceeding in which the public
complains."0
If the supreme court seems ambivalent about the requirements for
standing in taxpayer suits, the courts of appeal, in subsequent cases, have
been no more decisive. Pierce v. Board of Supervisors, a first circuit
decision, follows League closely, citing it for the proposition that a
taxpayer without a special and individual interest lacks standing "to
champion a cause pertaining to the population at large," and finding
that League overruled an earlier line of cases." On the other hand, in
Davis v. Franklin Parish School Board, the second circuit "respectfully
disagree[d]" with the Pierce court's contention that the earlier line of
cases, which allowed standing to taxpayers without a showing of a
special or peculiar interest, had been overruled by League.'2 The Davis
court allowed a taxpayer to challenge a school board lease, limiting the
special interest requirement of League to situations in which plaintiffs
seek to compel a mandated act rather than to restrain an unlawful one.
As the plaintiff sought to restrain a public body, the suit was allowed.
Before League, there were numerous Louisiana decisions in which
plaintiffs were denied or granted standing in actions against public
officials, but a survey of the jurisprudence reveals no clear pattern.
Generally, however, plaintiffs who bring actions against public officials
have been divided into two categories: (1) those who seek to enforce a
private right, and (2) those who seek to enforce a public right. 3 A
9. 381 So. 2d at 449 (Dixon, J., dissenting).
10. 199 La. 146, 159, 5 So. 2d 531, 535 (1941).
II. 392 So. 2d 465, 467 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980).
12. 412 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 415 So. 2d 942 (La.
1982).
13. 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus §§ 388-91 (1970) actually names three categories, the
third being suits to enforce duties owed to the state in its sovereign capacity. As the
third category has not been well developed in Louisiana jurisprudence, it will not be
treated in this note. For an example of a duty owed to the state in its sovereign capacity,
see State ex rel. Schoeffner v. Dowling, 158 La. 706, 104 So. 624 (1925), where the court
held that the duty to appoint a public health officer was to be enforced by the executive
branch, and not by a taxpayer suit. A fourth category, instances in which a citizen or,
more commonly, "any interested party," is granted standing by statute, can be identified.
1985]
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special and peculiar interest is required only of those in the first category,
those who seek to enforce a private right. On the other hand, those
who seek to enforce a public right need allege merely that an illegal
act has threatened to increase their tax burden or has otherwise inju-
riously affected them. To a large extent, incongruous decisions in this
area can be attributed to instances in which the courts have failed to
recognize that the test for one who sues to enforce a public right is
different from that used when one sues to enforce a private right.
However, it should also be noted that the courts have generally failed
to confront the policy issues behind the tests and furthermore, that the
outcome in taxpayer or citizen suits is actually or should be determined
by a weighing of various policy considerations, including judicial re-
straint, judicial efficiency, the availability of the political process as a
source of a remedy, and the source of the duty allegedly owed by public
officials.
In the area of standing to sue public officials, the simplest of the
situations is that of the first category, in which a plaintiff seeks to
enforce a private right. If the right is truly a personal one, then the
plaintiff should be able to state a special and peculiar interest. A number
of Louisiana cases exemplify this rule. A plaintiff alleging breach of
contract or tortious injury by a public official clearly has standing to
sue unless barred by a constitutional, statutory, or jurisprudential doc-
trine of sovereign immunity or other, more specific bars. 4 Even when
sovereign immunity was in effect in Louisiana, citizens with particular
interests were not always without relief, for it was held, however par-
adoxically, that a "suit by a citizen to recover possession of real property,
or to enforce a real right, against officers or agents of the state, who
assert title and possession in behalf of the state, is not a suit against
the state . . . ." Also, where a public official grants a contract to a
party who has not made a legal bid,. a party who has made a legal bid
has standing to sue for rescission. 6 Additionally, public employees have
standing to compel mayors and council members to approve and disburse
pay increases required by statute.' 7 What these cases have in common
is the special or peculiar interest which sets the individual apart from
the general public. That is, some act or omission of the state has harmed
or threatens to harm the plaintiff individually and does not harm the
public generally. Thus, when the injury sustained or the right sought
to be enforced is private, standing should be measured by the standards
involved in a lawsuit between two private parties.
The more difficult situation-the one with which this note is pri-
marily concerned-arises when a plaintiff seeks to enforce a duty owed
14. See, e.g., Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
15. Richardson v. Liberty Oil Co., 143 La. 130, 78 So. 326 (1918) (court syllabus).
16. State ex rel. Brenner v. Noe, 186 La. 102, 171 So. 708 (1936).
17. Prevost v. Baton Rouge City Council, 106 So. 2d 758 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1958).
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to the public generally or to all taxpayers in a certain jurisdiction. In
these cases the injury alleged or the right sought to be enforced is not
unique or particular to the plaintiff, but is sustained by or owed to the
public generally. Perhaps the most frequently cited-and most frequently
misunderstood-case in this area is State ex rel. Schoeffner v. Dowling. 8
It is important to note exactly what the court in Schoeffner held, as it
often has been cited for a proposition for which it may not stand.
Though the League majority cites Schoeffner for the proposition that
a taxpayer must have a special or peculiar interest to enforce a duty
owed the public at large, the plaintiff in Schoeffner was held not to
be suing "in behalf of the public but solely on his own behalf as an
individual citizen and taxpayer."' 9
In Schoeffner the plaintiff, alleging that he was a taxpayer and a
citizen, sought a writ of mandamus requiring the state health officer to
appoint a parish board of health pursuant to the state constitution.
However, the plaintiff had not alleged that he was suing on behalf of
the public, and his standing was evaluated as if he were attempting to
enforce a private right. Once the court held that the plaintiff was suing
"on his own behalf," it was inevitable that it should find he lacked
standing, as there was "no allegation of fact to be found in the petition
going to show any special pecuniary or financial interest of relator
... 1,20 Thus, Schoeffner does not stand for the proposition that one
suing on behalf of the public to enforce a public right must allege a
"special and peculiar interest," but only for the proposition that one
suing on his own behalf to enforce such a right must show such injuries.
The Schoeffner court was perhaps overly ingenious in distinguishing
between the plaintiff who would succeed because' he pleaded that his
suit was "in behalf of the public" and a plaintiff who Would fail
because he sued "on his own behalf as an individual citizen and tax-
payer." ' 2' Whether a plaintiff who sues as a taxpayer should be denied
standing for such a technical deficiency in the pleadings is questionable,
and other cases have held that, in a taxpayer suit, the action should
be "regarded as having a public character, and as being a proceeding
in which the public complains. '22
Contrary to Schoeffner, a number of Louisiana cases have held that
a plaintiff who sues on behalf of the public need not allege a special
and peculiar interest in order to have standing.23 Even the authorities
cited in Schoeffner seem to support this proposition. "The true dis-
18. 158 La. 706, 104 So. 624 (1925).
19. Id. at 711, 104 So. at 626.
20. Id. at 709, 104 So. at 625.
21. Id. at 711, 104 So. at 626.
22. Donaldson v. Police Jury, 161 La. 471, 480, 109 So. 34, 38 (1926).
23. Woodard v. Reily, 244 La. 337, 152 So. 2d 41 (1963); Suarez v. Police Jury,
203 La. 680, 14 So. 2d 601 (1943); Donaldson v. Police Jury, 161 La. 471, 109 So. 34
(1926); Upper Audubon Ass'n v. Audubon Park Cornm'n, 329 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 240.
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tinction," according to the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, quoted
by the Schoeffner court, "seems to be that ... if the general public
as distinguished from the state in its sovereign capacity is affected, any
member of the state may sue out the writ." ' 24 Thus, when one sues as
a taxpayer to enforce a right due the public generally, he should not
have to make a showing of a special and peculiar injury.25
In following Schoeffner, the League court identifies as the general
rule the proposition that a plaintiff seeking to proceed against a public
officer must show "some special interest . . . separate and distinct from
the interest of the public at large." '2 6 The League court then proceeds
to find an exception to this general rule in Bussie v. Long: "when a
public official charged with the unlawful performance or the refusal to
perform a legal duty discriminates against a taxpayer by increasing his
tax burden or otherwise injuriously affecting his person or property,
the taxpayer need not show such an interest in order to sustain a right
of action." '27 It is perhaps more appropriate to say that Bussie was the
rule and not the exception, at least in the earlier jurisprudence.
There are, under what appears to be the mainstream of Louisiana
jurisprudence, two requirements for standing to enforce a public right:
the public official's act or failure to act must (1) transcend his legal
powers, and (2) injure the fiscal interests of taxpayers or the general
public.' Louisiana courts have found public officials or bodies to have
24. 26 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure 402 (W. Mack ed. 1907). Shortly following
this quote, the court again draws verbatim from the Cyclopedia: "if the public interest
is not injuriously affected . . . a private individual cannot enforce it solely in behalf of
the public." Id. at 404. The consistent inverse of this proposition is that when the public
interest is injuriously affected by an illegal act of a public officer, a citizen suing on
behalf of the public will have standing.
25. Schoeffner, of course, states the contrary of this rule: "the great weight of
authority is decidedly to the effect that, without some peculiar, special, and individual
interest, a citizen, though he be a taxpayer, has no standing in court to champion a
cause or subject matter which pertains to the whole people in common ....... 158 La.
at 710, 104 So. at 626. However, this statement, despite the fact that it has been cited
as the holding of Schoeffner, must be considered dicta since the situation of a plaintiff
suing on behalf of the public was not before the court. See supra text accompanying
note 20.
26. 381 So. 2d at 447. Most earlier courts would have found this requirement
appropriate only when a plaintiff sued in an individual, rather than a representative
capacity.
27. Id. In finding a general requirement of a special interest and an exception in the
case of official acts which injuriously affect taxpayers, League and Bussie follow the first
paradigm.
28. Woodard v. Reily, 244 La. 337, 152 So. 2d 41 (1963); Carso v. Board of
Liquidation, 205 La. 368, 17 So. 2d 358 (1944); Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 146, 5 So.
2d 531 (1941); Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So. 2d 761 (1941); Borden v. Louisiana
Bd. of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929); Donaldson v. Police Jury, 161 La. 471,
109 So. 34 (1926); Bienvenu v. Police Jury, 126 La. 1103, 53 So. 362 (1910); Saxon v.
City of New Orleans, 124 La. 717, 50 So. 663 (1909); Hudson v. Police Jury, 107 La.
387, 31 So. 868 (1902); State ex rel. Orr v. City of New Orleans, 50 La. Ann. 880, 24
So. 666 (1898); Upper Audubon Ass'n v. Audubon Park Comm'n, 329 So. 2d 206 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 240 (La. 1976). See Cully v. City of New Orleans,
173 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 175 So. 2d 109 (La. 1965); Sutton v.
Buie, 136 La. 234, 66 So. 956 (1914).
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transcended their legal powers and have therefore granted standing to
taxpayers in a number of instances. If a public body violates a con-
stitutional provision, a taxpayer may have standing to contest the validity
of the body's act.2 9 If a public body makes an illegal expenditure, a
taxpayer may sue to enjoin it or to have it declared illegal: "we cannot
see that any harmful result will be obtained by permitting taxpayers
who support the Government to complain of the illegal expenditure of
public monies. If a taxpayer cannot complain-who else would have
the right?"3 Taxpayers may attack a contract made in an unauthorized
proceeding or in violation of a statute.3 Though early cases forbade
attacks against state officials while allowing attacks on municipal of-
ficials, taxpayers were later allowed to attack an allegedly unconstitu-
tional act of the state legislature.32 When municipal officials use a
building for a purpose other than that designated by an election, a
taxpayer may challenge the illegal use.33
The second requirement for standing in a case where a plaintiff
seeks to enforce a public right is an injury to the public fisc. According
to mainstream pre-League jurisprudence, the plaintiff need not plead a
special injury; he need only claim that the act or failure to act "will
increase the burden of taxation or otherwise injuriously affect the tax-
payers or their property." 3 ' Once he shows that the tax burden is af-
fected, no matter how slightly, a plaintiff should have successfully met
the requirement of alleging an injury: "a taxpayer who contributes a part
of the funds involved-no matter how infinitesimal-has a definite interest
he can assert in this cause." 35
Whether a non-pecuniary injury will suffice to establish standing is
not clear. Early cases allowed standing to citizens who complained that
certain streets were closed when a railroad right of way was granted
and to citizens who sought to keep a park open by preventing the
building of a civic auditorium.3 6 A more recent case, however, held that
the construction of a community center on property which had been
29. State ex rel. Orr v. City of New Orleans, 50 La. Ann. 880, 24 So. 666 (1898);
Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So. 2d 761 (1941).
30. Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 146, 161, 5 So. 2d 531, 536 (1941).
31. Donaldson v. Police Jury, 161 La. 471, 109 So. 34 (1926); Bienvenu v. Police
Jury, 126 La. 1103, 53 So. 362 (1910); Hudson v. Police Jury, 107 La. 387, 31 So. 868
(1902).
32. Sutton v. Buie, 136 La. 234, 66 SO. 956 (1914); Borden v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Educ., 168 La. 1005, 123 So. 655 (1929).
33. Sugar v. City of Monroe, 108 La. 677, 32 So. 961 (1902). But see Cully v. City
of New Orleans, 173 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 175 So. 2d 109 (La.
1965).
34. Donaldson v. Police Jury, 161 La. 471, 109 So. 34, 38 (1926). See State ex rel.
Orr v. City of New Orleans, 50 La. Ann. 880, 24 So. 666 (1898).
35. Woodard v. Reily, 244 La. 337, 353, 152 So. 2d 41, 47 (1963).
36. Connell v. Commission Council, 153 La. 788, 96 So. 657 (1923); Anderson v.
Thomas, 166 La. 512, 117 So. 573 (1928).
19851
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
willed to the city for the establishment of a trade school did not increase
the tax burden and hence the alleged injury was not sufficient to confer
standing.17 A 1947 court of appeal case found that the plaintiff, a
legislator suing as a taxpayer, lacked standing to force the Louisiana
Secretary of State to promulgate a bill which had passed the legislature,
as his interest was no different than that of any other citizen, and he
did not seek to prevent the expenditure of any state funds." This line
of reasoning would support the assertion that an injustice which can
not be measured in pecuniary terms is without redress, and there is
other jurisprudence to this effect. Marshall v. Town of Marksville held,
for example, that though taxpayers had the right to inquire into fiscal
matters, they were without standing "in matters purely moral, political,
or social" and were held not to have standing to bring an action to
annul an election allowing the issuance of liquor licenses.3 9 Jumonville
v. Hebert held that taxpayer-plaintiffs lacked standing to obtain a writ
of mandamus against public officials for the enforcement of gambling
laws.4 0
It is important to remember that a taxpayer suit is regarded as
having a public character and as being a proceeding in which the public
domplains.4' This fact is illustrated by the test used to determine the
jurisdictional amount in such cases. The size of the injury alleged is
not measured by the taxpayer's often insignificant personal interest, but
by the size of the injury to the public fisc. 42 Thus, one with a very
small personal injury may be allowed standing if he alleges an injury
to the public fisc of sufficient magnitude.
As the League decision was hardly unanimous, it remains to be
seen whether it effects a permanent shift in the requirements for standing
to sue public officials in Louisiana. Though Pierce v. Board of Super-
visors suggests that League overruled several earlier cases, this suggestion
37. Cully v. City of New Orleans, 173 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
175 So. 2d 109 (La. 1965).
38. Cleveland v. Martin, 29 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1947). The court also
considered the fact that the plaintiff was both a legislator and an employer, noting that
the former qualification might give him a special and peculiar interest, while the latter
might support a finding of a pecuniary interest. (The decision rested on other grounds.)
This demonstrates the fine line between the allegations necessary to support a claim to
a private right and those necessary to support a claim to enforce a right of the public
generally. The same plaintiff may be able to plead either, and a well-considered petition
might contain pleadings supportive of claims to both private rights and rights of the
public generally.
39. 116 La. 746, 41 So. 57 (La. 1906).
40. 170 So. 497 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1936).
41. Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 146, 5 So. 2d 531 (1941).
42. Saxon v. City of New Orleans, 124 La. 717, 50 So. 663 (1909). Sugar v. City
of Monroe, 108 La. 677, 32 So. 961 (1902).
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is probably incorrect." League, however, does further define the nature
of the relief which a taxpayer-plaintiff must seek in order to enforce a
right of the general public. League holds that when taxpayers seek to
compel an increase in taxes, they will be found to lack standing. How-
ever, since the plaintiffs in League sought to increase taxes directly, it
is not clear whether League would deny standing to a party who sought
relief which would indirectly raise taxes. That is, it may still be possible.
to obtain relief in the form of an act by a public official which would
necessitate an expenditure, so long as that act itself is not the raising
of taxes. However, taken to an extreme, League could be read to stand
for the proposition that a taxpayer alleging an illegal act affecting the
public generally would lack standing to force a public official to take
any action, since most actions would have some costs associated with
them. If this is indeed the case, the compel/restrain distinction raised
by the Davis court may prove to be a valuable one: since restraining
an official would almost always result in fiscal savings, while compelling
would generally force some expenditure, one could compel an official
to act only when one had a special and peculiar interest and was thus
suing to enforce a private right."
If League is read this way, it denies judicial access to many potential
plaintiffs: anyone requesting relief that would have the effect of forcing
public expenditure, however minute, would be denied standing. Such a
solution seems harsh, especially in cases where the public expenditure
would be small and the public injury great or where constitutional rights
are concerned.
Decisions concerning standing to sue to enforce public rights are
ultimately based on policy. Where the electoral process provides adequate
remedies, access to the courts can fairly be restricted. However, where
the damages to the public welfare which the plaintiff alleges are especially
grievious or will be beyond remedy by the time the electoral process
has run its course, judicial action is more justifiable. To the extent that
they encourage public participation in government without seriously
impeding executive and legislative functions, taxpayer suits should be
encouraged. Nonetheless, if there is a trend in the Louisiana jurisprud-
ence, it is probably toward stricter requirements for standing to enforce
a right due the public generally. This trend is evidenced by the courts'
43. 392 So. 2d 465 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). Pierce claims that a taxpayer needs a
special and peculiar interest to champion a cause pertaining to the public at large. This
is a confusing (and perhaps confused) statement in that it overlooks the Bussie exception
established by League. Thus, contrary to Pierce, the following cases, which allow taxpayer
standing, should remain good law: Stewart v. Stanley, 199 La. 146, 5 So. 2d 531 (1941);
Woodard v. Reily, 244 La. 337, 152 So. 2d 41 (1963); Upper Audubon Ass'n v. Audubon
Park Comm'n, 329 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 240 (La.
1976).
44. See supra, text at note 11.
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recent reliance, in at least three cases, upon the strict standards of
federal jurisprudence in considering problems of standing.4 5
Although a 1923 United States Supreme Court case, Massachusetts
v. Mellon,46 noted that standing requirements might be lower for plain-
tiffs bringing actions against small political entities than for plaintiffs
suing federal officials, that case is dated and it could be argued that
today's state political structures are as complex as that of the federal
government in 1923. The federal requirements for standing are spelled
out in Flast v. Cohen, where the Court developed a two-part test for
standing to sue federal officials.4 7 First, a taxpayer must establish a link
between his status as taxpayer and the legislative act attacked. Thus,
only those Acts of Congress which rely on the taxing and spending
clause can be attacked by a taxpayer. Secondly, the taxpayer must show
that the challenged act exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed
on the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending powers, and
not simply that "the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated
to Congress by article 1, section 8.' '41 Comparing the Louisiana and
federal constitutional provisions on standing, the League court recognized
that the Louisiana Constitution (Article I, section 2) guarantees access
to the courts, but noted that greater protection is to be afforded to
fundamental interests of constitutional importance than to non-consti-
tutional rights. The court then distinguished between those plaintiffs
with constitutional claims and those with less compelling complaints. In
the latter situatioa, the court would restrict standing to those with a
special interest apart from the interest of the general public. Though
the League decision rests on other grounds, this dicta may indicate that,
in the future, public officials who act in ways that are merely illegal
(i.e., not unconstitutional) may be immune from public interest suits.
Standing involves a balancing of the right to be heard with judicial
and governmental efficiency, and it is difficult to devise a bright-line
test which would neither deprive a worthy plaintiff of a forum nor
threaten to impair the functioning of the courts and government. Whether
League will be followed in the future may depend more upon the equities
of the cases that present themselves than upon precedent. The closeness
of the decision is testimony that this is an unsettled area and will
probably continue to be so.
J. Keith Hardie, Jr.
45. Pierce, 392 So. 2d 465; League, 381 So. 2d 441; Louisiana Hotel-Motel Ass'n
v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 385 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1980).
46. 262 U.S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923).
47. 392 U.S. 83, 88 S. Ct. 1942 (1968).
48. Id. at 103, 88 S. Ct. at 1954.
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